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Abstract 
Many developed markets have taken what appears to be a tough stance on illegal insider 
trading through the use of criminal sanctions. Although criminal sanctions represent a much 
greater penalty than civil sanctions, the higher burden of proof required makes their 
enforceability weaker. This trade-off between severity and enforceability makes the impact of 
criminal sanctions ambiguous. In this paper, we empirically examine this issue by studying 
the deterrence of insider trading following the introduction of criminal sanctions in a 
developed market. Significant changes in sanction regimes are rare, especially when criminal 
sanctions are introduced without other changes. In February 2008, New Zealand introduced 
criminal sanctions for insider trading. This change of law offers a unique setting in which to 
examine the deterrence effect of criminalization. Using measures for the cost of trading, 
degree of information asymmetry, and probability of informed trading, we find that the 
enactment of this law led to a worsening in these measures. These findings suggest that the 
weaker enforceability of criminalization outweighs the associated increased severity of the 
penalties.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Deterrence of prohibited activities is a function of both the severity of the punishment 
(sanctions) and probability of detection and prosecution (enforcement) (Becker, 1968). As a 
result, it is important for law makers when developing laws to consider both severity and 
enforceability of the laws. In finance, this debate has largely evolved around the issue of 
illegal insider trading, where different countries have developed different approaches in an 
attempt to deter corporate insiders from expropriating their shareholders. However, as noted 
by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009), for insider trading laws to be effective they must be 
enforceable, and if they are not enforced, a country may actually be better off with no laws at 
all.  
 
In policy discussions around insider trading (although insider trading can be both legal and 
illegal, in this paper we use the term insider trading to refer to illegal insider trading), the 
issue of severity versus enforceability has often focused on the type of sanctions imposed. 
Criminal sanctions present a much stronger penalty than civil sanctions given the potential 
for jail sentences in addition to the stigma of a criminal conviction if the prosecution is 
successful. However, the burden of proof required (i.e. the level of certainty required for a 
guilty verdict to be delivered) is also significantly higher in a criminal case.
1
 Therefore, while 
criminal sanctions offer more severe penalties, they are also less likely to result in a 
successful prosecution. This view was clearly articulated in a speech by members of the US 
Securities Exchange Commission in 1998, where they argued that illegal insider trading is 
largely inferential. Cases are often based around circumstantial evidence relating to meetings, 
phone calls and presumed possession of information, making it difficult to establish guilt to 
the criminal standard, beyond a reasonable doubt (Newkirk and Robertson, 1998). A similar 
point of view was recently stressed by the Chairman of the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission who noted that despite recent successful criminal prosecutions, the 
burden of proof and the evidence required remained problematic (D’Aloisio, 2010). He 
referred to a quote from Duffy (2009) exploring issues around the burden of proof:  
                                                          
1
Civil cases in common law jurisdictions are decided on the balance of probabilities, requiring it to be only more 
likely than not that an offence was committed. Criminal cases are decided on the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
test, a much tougher burden to meet, especially when prosecuting on the basis of largely circumstantial evidence 
as is often the case for insider trading.  
4 
 
 
“Regulators will often find themselves in a position where they can identify a person 
with inside information on a particular security, a person who traded in that security, a 
relationship between the two persons and even evidence of communications between 
them (such as telephone records). This however may still not be enough unless there 
is some evidence of the content of the communications and, in particular, the 
conveying of price sensitive information that was not generally available. Further, 
though a circumstantial case for communication may exist, it is usually necessary to 
establish what was said to identify it as price sensitive information. Also, given the 
seriousness of such an allegation it is unlikely that evidence of such communication 
can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances” Duffy (2009) pg. 155  
 
 
The implication of this statement is that mere circumstantial evidence of possession of 
information, and communication with another person who then trades in a manner consistent 
with that information is not enough if the content of the communication itself is not known. 
Additionally, traders can point to ‘explanations’ which, while improbable, may be sufficient 
to create reasonable doubt.  
 
The case of Martha Stewart in the US illustrates the actual difficulties in achieving criminal 
convictions for insider trading. Stewart received information from her broker regarding 
trading in Imclone by the CEO. Based on that information, Stewart sold 4,000 shares shortly 
before a major announcement resulting in Stewart avoiding losses of $45,673. Stewart faced 
both civil and criminal cases for her involvement. Her defence was based on a fictitious limit 
order to sell if Imclone dropped below $60. While Stewart was indicted on 9 charges 
including insider trading, the insider trading charges were dropped before the criminal case 
was heard. In contrast, her civil case resulted in an out-of-court settlement on the insider 
trading allegation which saw her receive a 5-year ban from acting as a director, repaying her 
gains of $45,673 plus interest and a pecuniary penalty of three times the loss avoided (US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2006).  
 
The example of Martha Stewart illustrates the trade-off between severity and enforceability 
and demonstrates that there is an ambiguous effect on the deterrence of insider trading. This 
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ambiguous effect exists when criminal sanctions replace civil sanction, but also when 
criminal sanctions and civil sanctions co-exist. As Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) argue, if a 
law is enacted but not enforced it will deter some insider from trading illegally. However, 
those that are not deterred will trade with greater intensity (see also Bris, 2005). This may 
also apply to the situation where criminal sanctions are introduced in addition to civil 
sanctions. The addition of criminal sanctions may deter some insiders who were not deterred 
by the weaker civil sanctions, but those that are not deterred will trade with greater intensity. 
Overall, as suggested by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009), enforceability is key. If insiders see 
the laws as being enforceable market quality will improve, if not market quality may 
deteriorate.    
 
In this paper, we examine the deterrence effect following the introduction of criminal 
sanctions on insider trading. Major changes in sanction regimes are exceptional, especially 
when criminal sanctions are introduced without other significant changes. In February 2008, 
the New Zealand government enacted the Securities Market Amendment Act 2006 (SMAA), 
which introduced criminal sanctions. This offers a unique setting to examine the deterrence 
effect of criminalization.
2
 Prior to this act, the law allowed for civil penalties of three times 
the value of the gain made or loss avoided or one million dollars, whichever is greater. The 
SMAA introduced a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment and/or a NZ$300,000 fine 
for an individual found guilty of insider trading. We study this change in legislation to 
determine whether the criminalization of insider trading has been beneficial.  
 
To empirically investigate the impact of these new laws, we collect data for the most liquid 
companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) for twelve-, six- and three-month 
windows around the enactment date, 29 February 2008. We examine a range of information 
asymmetry measures, specifically the percentage spread, the effective spread, the price 
impact of trades, the proportion of information asymmetry by Lin et al. (1995), and the 
probability of informed trading (Easley et al., 1996, 1997a, 1997b).
3
 Using an event study 
type of methodology, we explore changes in these measures before and after the enactment of 
                                                          
2
 During the event window studied no other securities bills were enacted or passed into law.  
3
These measures have previously been used to examine changes in insider trading laws in Gilbert et al. (2007) 
and Frijns et al. (2008) 
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the SMAA. The results for all measures indicate that the introduction of criminal sanctions 
has led to a statistically significant increase in the cost of trading and the proportion of 
information asymmetry. These results are also economically significant, where the effective 
spread has increased by an average of 63% in the period from twelve months before the 
enactment to twelve months after the enactment. To ensure the robustness of these results, we 
sort our sample into firms that are most and least likely to be affected by the reforms (liquid 
vs. illiquid and high vs. low information asymmetry) and examine the effect on our informed 
trading measures. The results, when sorted on trading activity, reveal that illiquid firms see 
the biggest deterioration in the informed trading measures. Lastly, we employ a difference-in-
difference approach using a control sample of similar Australian firms, who are not subject to 
the sanction regime in New Zealand, to control for other potential market-wide effects. These 
results confirm that the introduction of criminal sanctions has failed to improve the efficiency 
of the market, and has in fact made it worse.  
 
Overall, our findings suggest that the change in legislation has reduced the deterrence effect 
of the laws. Since there has been no enforcement of insider trading laws in New Zealand, our 
findings also support Bhattacharya and Daouk’s (2009) hypothesis that no law may be better 
than a good law when enforcement is poor. Given the popularity and widespread use of 
criminal sanctions to deter insider trading and the lack of empirical evidence on their 
efficacy, these findings may have considerable policy implications for many countries. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and 
introduces the New Zealand market and its insider trading regulations. Section 3 presents the 
microstructure measures that we employ and discusses the sample. Section 4 presents the 
paper’s findings and Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
Criminal sanctions for illegal insider trading have been introduced in many countries. Beny 
(2004) finds criminal sanctions in 27 out of 36 countries in her sample, and more recently, 
Frijns et al. (2010) find that these sanctions are present in 26 out of 31 countries in their 
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sample. This popularity has largely been driven by the perception of lawmakers and market 
observers that criminal sanctions offer a greater deterrence than civil penalties. For example, 
after its introduction of a criminal-only regime, the Dutch regulators lauded their approach as 
the “toughest regime” (Financial Times, 1998). In addition, Joo (2007) argues that increasing 
criminal sanctions satisfies the appearance of being tough on market manipulation by sending 
a message that insider trading will be treated extremely seriously. This also conforms with 
Easterbrook (1985), who suggests that the threat of imprisonment may lead to optimal 
deterrence. A discussion paper by the New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development 
notes that criminal penalties may carry a stigma that civil prosecution does not. This 
reputational harm may be a significant deterrent (Ministry of Economic Development, 2000).  
 
Several studies have investigated the deterrence effect of insider trading laws. Beny (2005) 
and Bris (2005) find that stronger laws are more effective in controlling the harm from 
insider trading (Beny, 2005) and its profitability (Bris, 2005). Frijns et al. (2008) look at the 
introduction of new insider trading laws in New Zealand in 2002 that increased the strength 
of the local rules, and find that those laws resulted in a significant reduction in information 
asymmetry in the market. While these studies do not specifically look at the effect of 
criminalization, they do show that the strength of insider trading laws can have a significant 
impact on markets.  
 
While the seriousness of the threat imposed by criminal sanctions is not disputed, a number 
of studies have suggested that the increased burden of proof makes prosecution much less 
likely (Rakoff and Eaton, 1993; Engelen, 2006). Engelen (2006) argues that criminalization 
in Europe failed to achieve the goal of ensuring integrity in financial markets. Rakoff and 
Eaton (1993) highlight the difficulties in successfully prosecuting insiders criminally.  
 
The importance of enforceability has recently been stressed by several studies.  Bhattacharya 
and Daouk (2002) study the impact of the introduction and first enforcement of insider 
trading laws on the cost of capital. They find that the introduction of laws has no effect on the 
cost of capital, but that there is a significant reduction following the first enforcement. 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) further find that those countries that enact laws but do not 
enforce them wind up with higher costs of capital than those that do not enact insider trading 
laws at all. Their study strongly suggests that enforceability is key in improving market 
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conditions. However, no empirical study has yet examined the introduction of criminal 
sanctions and its impact on financial markets. 
 
2.2 The New Zealand Market 
The NZX is one of the smaller developed markets in the world (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 
2002). The NZX currently lists around 160 companies. In addition, trading activity is 
relatively low, with around 41,598 trades, representing a combined value of NZ$ 2.7 billion 
in the month of February 2008. The market capitalization for the total market is NZ$ 37 
billion. The NZX runs an electronic limit order book. New Zealand rates relatively high in 
most of the law and finance investor protection measures (La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et 
al., 2008).  
 
In 1999 and the early 2000s, the government focused strongly on regulatory factors that may 
have been undermining the local market. In particular, it was argued that the relatively light-
handed regulation in the past had resulted in a lack of investor confidence. One area that was 
highlighted in particular was insider trading, which was governed by a private enforcement 
regime. Since insider trading was explicitly included in securities legislation in 1988, no 
insiders have been successfully prosecuted and in several cases relatively high profile 
individuals avoided prosecution either through legal loopholes or by settling out of court. 
These cases included one where an insider, Eric Watson then CEO of the Blue Star Group, 
traded heavily prior to the announcement of an acquisition of McCollum Printer. Watson 
avoided prosecution due to a legal technicality and only surrendered his profit without 
additional penalties. In another case, Kerry Hoggard, then Chairman of Fletcher Challenge, 
purchased heavily before a major restructuring announcement. This case was settled out of 
court with financial penalties but other penalties relating to his ability to serve as a director 
were not imposed. As a result of the failure to convict insiders in these cases and with a 
number of other suspected instances of insider trading that were not prosecuted, the 
government introduced changes to the laws governing insider trading in the early 2000’s.  
 
The first change in the laws, introduced in 2002 and enacted in 2004, changed the private 
enforcement regime that had prevailed in New Zealand and tasked a local watchdog, the 
Securities Commission, with prosecuting insider trading. Soon after the enactment the 
Commission attempted prosecution of a number of insiders in Transrail, a local railroad 
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company, who sold heavily prior to the announcement of poor financial performance, 
collectively avoiding $47 million in losses. The prosecution wound up settling out of court, 
resulting in insiders repaying $27 million without an admission of guilt. This case arguably 
undermined the deterrence of insider trading. 
  
In earlier discussions on the 2002 laws, the introduction of criminal sanctions was mooted as 
a way of increasing deterrence. While there was little public support for criminalization, it 
was nevertheless introduced in a second round of amendments in 2006. These amendments, 
which came into effect in February 2008, added criminal sanctions of a maximum of 5 years 
in jail and/or a $300,000 fine to the existing civil sanctions available. Since its enactment in 
2008, no attempts have been made by the public regulator to bring a prosecution against 
insiders. 
 
 
3. Methodology and Data  
 
3.1 Measures of Informed Trading 
Evaluating the efficacy of insider trading laws is not straightforward because of the opaque 
nature of illegal insider trading. Given the potential penalties associated with being caught, 
insiders have strong incentives to hide their trading from the market and regulators. As such, 
obtaining a direct measure for the impact of insider trading is difficult. However, the 
consequence of insider trading is observable through several indirect measures. For example, 
based on the idea that normal (uninformed) investors must be compensated for the cost of 
insider trading, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) explore changes in the country-level cost of 
capital to proxy for the harm from insider trading. Beny (2005) looks at price synchronicity, 
the concentration of shareholdings and liquidity, while Bris (2005) looks at price run-ups and 
abnormal trading prior to takeover announcements.
4
  
 
As an alternative approach to measuring the impact of insider trading, we turn to the market 
microstructure literature which focuses on the bid-ask spread and its components. The bid-
                                                          
4
While Bris (2005) uses a relatively direct measure of the prevalence of insider trading, it requires a significant 
amount of takeover activity before and after new legislation is introduced, and these restrictions are particularly 
problematic for a small stock exchange like New Zealand.  
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ask spread is often referred to as the cost of trading or the market maker’s compensation for 
these costs. These costs relate to operational costs, such as order processing or inventory 
costs, but also contain information asymmetry costs, i.e. the cost incurred when trading 
against a better informed counterparty. Insiders, when trading on their inside information are 
better informed counterparties, and any uninformed investor trading against them will lose in 
the transaction, a notion supported by a considerable wealth of literature detailing the 
profitability of insiders even when trading legally (see e.g., Jaffe 1974; Finnerty 1976; 
Seyhun 1986, 1998;  Rozeff and Zaman 1988; and Lakonishok and Lee 2001 for the US, 
Baesel and Stein 1979 for Canada, Del Brio et al., 2002 for Spain, Etebari, et al., 2004 for 
New Zealand and Pope et al. 1990; Friederich et al., 2002 for the UK). To compensate for 
this risk of trading with a better informed counterparty, the bid-ask spread includes 
compensation to cover the cost of trading losses incurred. This compensation can be thought 
of as the market’s expectation of the probability of trading against a better informed party and 
the average loss incurred. If insiders make up a sizeable proportion of the market, then this 
should be reflected in the spread. If a law reduces the prevalence of insider trading, then the 
proportion of informed traders in the market should decrease, and this should lead to a 
decrease in the spread. We explore the impact of criminalization of insider trading by 
considering four spread measures: the percentage spread; the effective spread; the price 
impact; and the proportion of information asymmetry based on Lin et al. (1995), and by 
considering the probability of informed trading (PIN) of Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b).  
 
3.1.1 The Percentage Spread 
The percentage spread is a measure of the overall cost of trading. It measures the spread as 
the percentage cost of a round trip trade if the trades were conducted at the quoted ask and 
bid prices. The percentage spread is measured as the difference between ask and bid prices 
divided by the midpoint of the quotes, i.e.  
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We employ intraday data to compute the percentage spread at the time of each trade, and 
compute the average percentage spread over all trades and companies in the sample. If the 
cost of trading reduces, i.e. the percentage spread decreases, it will encourage more trading, 
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increasing liquidity in the market and the value of the firm (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). 
As the goal of insider trading regulation is to reduce the harm from insider trading and 
ultimately promote market efficiency, a reduction in overall trading costs should be 
considered a good outcome.  
 
3.1.2 The Effective Spread 
The effective spread is similar to the percentage spread. However, the effective spread allows 
for trades to occur at different prices than the quoted bid and ask. This is particularly true in 
opaque markets where liquidity may not be fully reflected in quotes and opportunities exist to 
trade within the spread (Ready, 1999). But even in electronic markets traders can better 
existing quotes, or large orders can exhaust the shares available at the best price, resulting in 
execution prices that differ from quoted prices (Bessembinder and Venkataraman, 2010). In 
such cases, the effective spread is a more accurate measure of the actual trading costs. We 
measure the effective spread as the difference between the actual price at which a trade 
occurs and the midpoint of the prevailing quoted spread at the time of the trade, i.e., 
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One issue with both the effective and quoted spreads is that they represent the total trading 
costs an investor incurs. As stated above, a reduction in these measures is positive for the 
market and is a desirable outcome. However, while these improvements could be due to a 
reduction in insider trading they may be related to other factors, such as an improvement in 
liquidity. As such, we employ two spread measures that focus specifically on the information 
asymmetry component of the spread.  
 
3.1.3 The Price Impact of Trades 
Several studies that focus on the decomposition of spreads have noted that it is possible to 
identify the different cost components based on the impact of trades on subsequent prices. 
Specifically, order processing and inventory holding costs lead to price reversals after the 
trade and only have a temporary impact on prices. On the other hand, information-driven 
trades present new information and cause permanent shifts in the underlying value of the 
security. This is because informed traders who have, say, positive news will place buy orders 
but not sell orders, resulting in extra demand to buy. Market makers and liquidity providers 
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will observe this excess demand and adjust the bid and ask quotes to incorporate this 
information. As such, changes in the underlying value of the security between the time of the 
trade and some point in the near future reveal the market’s assessment of the informational 
component of that trade.  
 
Although the underlying value of a security is not directly observed, it is often proxied by the 
midpoint of the bid and ask quote (Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997; Huang and Stoll, 
1996, among others). As such, we measure the price impact of a trade as the absolute 
difference between the quoted midpoint n periods after the trade and the quoted midpoint at 
the time of the trade divided by the midpoint at the time of the trade, i.e.  
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where Mi,t is the quoted midpoint. The price impact measure has been shown to be relatively 
insensitive with respect to the choice of n (Werner, 2003), although using a window that is 
too long may cause other events to affect the price impact measure. In line with Huang and 
Stoll (1996) we choose a 5-minute window. If we observe an increase (decrease) in 
information asymmetry as a result of the change in legislation we should see an increase 
(decrease) in the price impact of the trade.  
 
3.1.4 Proportion of Information Asymmetry 
Lin et al. (1995) offer a model for calculating the proportion of information asymmetry 
similar to the price impact measure.
5
 They argue that in response to an order, market 
specialists will revise the quotes they offer. They do this to attract order flow to balance their 
position and to ensure their costs are covered. If market participants trade according to this 
pattern, i.e. a buy followed by a sell and vice versa, then prices will only change temporarily. 
If we see order persistence (a buy followed by a buy), the impact on prices becomes 
                                                          
5
Several other bid-ask spread decomposition models have been proposed by Madhavan et al. (1997), Huang and 
Stoll (1997) and Glosten and Harris (1988). All the approaches use similar reasoning although the specific 
methodologies do differ considerably in the method of estimation. The Lin et al. (1995) methodology however 
has been shown to estimate better than other models producing fewer implausible estimates (Van Ness et al. 
2001).   
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permanent. Lin et al. (1995) argue that the response of the midpoint to a trade at the bid or 
ask will reflect the degree of information asymmetry, i.e.  
 
     11   ttt ezm  ,     (4) 
 
where 1 tm  is the change in the log of the quoted midpoint at time t, ttt mpz   and pt is 
the log of the trade price at time t, and λ is the information asymmetry component of the 
spread. If the introduction of criminal sanctions has increased (decreased) information 
asymmetry, we would expect to see an increase (decrease) in λ. 
 
3.1.5 The Probability of Informed Trading  
As an alternative to the spread-based models, we also consider the probability of informed 
trading (PIN). The PIN, proposed by Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b), is a widely used 
measure for the proportion of informed trading. The PIN looks at order imbalances between 
buyer- and seller-initiated trades to identify the number of information driven trades 
compared with the number of noise trades. More formally, the model assumes there are two 
types of traders, uninformed traders who trade for liquidity purposes and arrive in the market 
at a rate ε, and informed traders who trade on days when they have private information (the 
probability having private information on a given day is given by α) and arrive at a rate μ. 
The information held by informed traders can be either bad news (with probability δ) or good 
news (with probability 1 - δ). On a day when informed traders have a bad news signal, buy 
orders will occur at rate ε but sell orders will occur at rate ε + μ creating an imbalance in the 
order flow. Likewise, on a good news day buy orders occur at rate ε + μ and sell orders at rate 
ε, while on no news days (1 - α) both buys and sells occur at rate ε. The probability that a 
trade is executed by an informed trader is defined as 
 


2
PIN .              (5) 
 
If we assume that the order arrivals follow a Poisson process, then the coefficients in 
Equation (5) and the PIN can be estimated by maximum likelihood. For a detailed discussion 
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on the PIN model and its estimation see Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b). An increase 
(decrease) in information asymmetry as a result of the change in sanctions will result in an 
increase (decrease) in PIN.  
 
3.2 Data 
To examine the impact of the introduction of the criminalization of insider trading on the 
market, intra-day price data are collected for New Zealand companies twelve months around 
the introduction of the law on 29 February 2008. We examine windows of three, six months 
and twelve months before and after the law’s introduction. Intra-day prices are collected from 
the Thompson Reuters Tick History database available from SIRCA
6
 for all available 
companies that survived over the sample period. However, as we need high-frequency data to 
estimate the information asymmetry component of the spread, we require that companies 
must have at least five trades per day on average and have trades on at least 30 days for both 
the pre- and post-change periods to be included. This results in a final sample of 51 
companies, or roughly one-third of the total number of companies listed on the NZX. For 
each of the measures discussed in Section 3.1, we compute two values, the pre-change and 
post-change value. Quoted and Effective Spreads, and Price Impacts are computed as the 
average of the per-trade values over the specific window. The Proportion of Information 
Asymmetry and the PIN are estimated based on all the available trades over the respective 
window.  
 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics. Over the entire sample period, we observe an average of 
35.49 trades per day, although this is subject to considerable variation with the smallest 
company having just 5.82 and the largest company having 222.13 trades per day. Compared 
with studies on other exchanges these values are low. Madhaven et al. (1997) report an 
average of 95 trades per day for the NYSE and Ahn et al. (2002) report 296 trades per day for 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. However, compared with an earlier study in New Zealand (Frijns 
et al., 2008), the mean trades per day has increased nearly twofold.  
 
                                                          
6
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
We observe that the average dollar spread is about 6.4 cents per share, although the median is 
4.96 cents per share. The minimum is less than one cent and the maximum 65 cents.
7
 The 
mean price is $4.36 and the minimum and maximum of $0.17 and $27.94, respectively. 
When looking at the pre- and post-enactment subsamples, we note some preliminary 
evidence regarding the impact of the law changes. We observe that quoted spreads have 
increased in the post-change period for all three windows, and that average prices and volume 
traded have decreased with the sharpest declines in the twelve month window. These changes 
also affect the minimums and maximums. This may provide some preliminary evidence that 
criminalization has harmed the market.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
To study whether the criminalization of insider trading in New Zealand has had a positive or 
negative impact on the market, we examine a range of bid-ask spread based measures that 
incorporate or measure the information asymmetry cost component of the spreads. In 
addition, we consider the PIN before and after the enactment of the new legislation. 
 
4.1 Univariate Analysis  
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results for the percentage spread. The percentage spread is a 
measure for the total cost of trading. Given that the goal of effective legislation should be to 
reduce overall market frictions, it is appropriate to look at the effect on percentage spreads. If 
the introduction of criminal sanctions has been positive (negative) for the market, we expect 
the percentage spreads to decrease (increase).  
 
For the full sample, we find that the average percentage spread is 2.22%. This is pushed up 
by a few companies that have larger percentage spreads as the median is slightly lower at 
1.92%. The percentage spreads are, however, larger than those reported by Frijns et al. (2008) 
(1.18%) in their study on the NZX or in studies of other markets, which typically find 
                                                          
7
Note that the minimum tick size is $0.01.  
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percentage spreads of less than 1% (Madhaven et al., 1997; Ahn et al., 2002). Most likely, 
this is a result of the minimum tick size of 1c per share and the low prices, as shown in Table 
1.  
 
When we examine the differences between the pre- and post-enactment periods, we observe a 
marked increase in the percentage spreads for all three windows, with increases of 0.3%, 
0.6% and 1% for the three-, six- and twelve-month samples, respectively. These gradual 
increases suggest that the law has taken some time to be fully reflected in the spreads. We 
observe similar increases in the medians and the tails of the sample. We conduct a t-test on 
the differences between the means before and after the enactment and find strong significance 
at the 1% level for all windows. In addition, we employ Mann-Whitney U tests to assess the 
significance of the differences in medians, which shows a significant increase of 0.54% and 
0.73% in the six- and twelve-month windows. Finally, we observe that as the windows get 
longer, the number of firms with larger percentage spreads following the introduction of the 
law increase. For the three-month window two-thirds of the firms have a post-change 
increase in percentage spread (34 out of 51) which rises to 80% in the six-month window (43) 
and 90% in the twelve-month window (46). These results are strongly supportive of an 
increase in quoted spreads following the introduction of criminalization.   
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
 
Panel B of Table 2 examines the effective spreads in the pre- and post-change periods. We 
again conclude there has been a deterioration in the trading costs. Average effective spreads 
increase significantly by 0.12%, 0.28% and 0.33% for the three-, six- and twelve-month 
samples, respectively. We also observe that the increase is present throughout the cross-
section of stocks with around 60% of companies seeing increases in the three and six-month 
windows and all except one in the twelve-month window. The twelve-month window also 
shows a significant increase in the median effective spread. These results further support the 
finding that there has been a worsening in the market around the introduction of criminal 
sanctions.  
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The results for overall trading costs suggest that there has been an increase in spreads around 
the time of the introduction of the criminal sanctions. To determine whether this is 
attributable to insider trading, we employ two measures to identify the information 
asymmetry component of the spread: the price impact of trades, and the Lin et al. (1995) 
measure.  
 
Panel C of Table 2 shows the results for the price impact of trades. On average, there is a 
permanent price change following a trade of approximately 0.45%. We observe a significant 
change in the price impact following the introduction of the new law, with a significant 
increase of 0.04% in the three-month sample, 0.07% for the six-month sample and 0.37% for 
the twelve-month sample. We also notice that the increase is omnipresent with increases in 
the medians, first and third quartile values for all the windows. Finally, the number of 
companies with increases is greater than the number of companies with decreases, nearly 
two-thirds for the three-month window, over 80% of companies for the six-month window 
and virtually all companies in the twelve-month sample.  
 
Our second information asymmetry measure is the proportion of information asymmetry of 
Lin et al. (1995). We conduct Wald tests on the difference in regression coefficients 
estimated for the pre- and post-change periods to see the number of significant increases and 
decreases and also a Chow test to see if there is a structural break around the time of the 
introduction of the new laws. If the law resulted in changes to the attitude of market 
participants about the prevalence and harm of insider trading, we expect to see changes in the 
size of the information asymmetry component of the spread.  
 
Panel D of Table 2 shows that, on average, 26% of the spread is made up of information 
asymmetry costs. As with the measures previously discussed, we see an increase in the 
average, median and quartile values for the estimated proportion of information asymmetry. 
We observe a nearly 2% increase in the information asymmetry component for the three-
month window, just over 3% for the six-month window and 12% for the twelve-month 
window. In addition, a quarter of the sample has a significant increase in the proportion of 
information asymmetry in the three-month window, over one-third for the six-month 
window, and two-thirds of the sample companies for the twelve-month window. By contrast, 
the number of firms with significant decreases is smaller than the number with increases for 
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the three-month sample and gets smaller with the longer windows. Finally, we observe a 
structural break for over 80% of the firms in all windows suggesting that the law change 
could be responsible for the changes observed.  
 
An alternative way of examining the impact of the introduction of criminal sanctions is to 
employ the PIN model of Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b). If criminalization has decreased 
insider participation in the market, we would expect to see a reduction in the PIN.  
 
Panel E of Table 2 presents the results for the PIN. The full sample shows that over this time 
period the average PIN was about 23.2% suggesting that nearly a quarter of all trades were 
informed. We also see that the standard deviation is relatively small at 6.66% suggesting a 
relatively narrow distribution. When we separate the results into the pre- and post-change 
groups we observe a marked increase in the PIN value across the entire range for the two 
shorter windows. For the six-month window there is a significant increase of 3.2% with a 
similar increase in the median. Likewise for the three-month window there is a significant 
increase of 2.5% with a slightly smaller increase in the median. However, the twelve-month 
window presents a slightly different picture with no significant changes in either the average 
or the median. We also observe that only just under half of the firms had an increase in the 
PIN.  
 
4.2 Trading Activity and Information Asymmetry Sorts 
As discussed by Easley et al. (1996), Gregory et al. (1997) and Friederich et al. (2002), not all 
companies are affected equally by insider trading. More liquid companies with more attention 
from analysts and the media tend to have fewer opportunities for insider trading as prices 
remain close to fundamentals and so are less affected. Frijns et al. (2008) show that this 
difference in prevalence also has an impact on the way legislation affects companies with less 
trading activity and those with greater pre-enactment information asymmetry. In line with 
this, we sort companies on the basis of total number of pre-enactment trades observed and 
also the pre-change information asymmetry estimates from the Lin et al. (1995) model and 
test whether the law changes have a greater effect on those companies most affected by 
insider trading. We take the twenty highest and lowest companies for each sort and 
recalculate the average values for each of the measures employed. In addition, we test for 
significant differences in the means.  
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Panel A of Table 3 shows the results for each of the five measures when we sort on the pre-
change number of trades. The results strongly support the idea that the changes in insider 
trading laws initially had a disproportionate effect on stocks with different levels of liquidity. 
When we examine the low trade group over the three- and six-month windows, we see 
significant differences in the pre- and post-enactment periods suggesting that illiquid stocks 
are adversely affected by the introduction of the new law. For the liquid stocks, we find no 
significant difference between pre- and post-change period with the exception of the PIN. 
The twelve-month sample, by contrast, shows significant differences for both low and high 
trade groups for all five measures, although the low trade PIN group has the wrong sign.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Panel B repeats the sorting but uses the pre-change information asymmetry of Lin et al. 
(1995). Overall, the results indicate that there has been a worsening in the cost of trading as a 
result of the introduction of the SMAA. However, we obtain significance for both low and 
high information asymmetry firms for four of the measures. We also find strong significance 
for all measures except of the PIN in the twelve-month sample.  
 
4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
The results of the means tests suggest that the introduction of criminal sanctions for insider 
trading has not been effective in deterring insiders. All of our measures show evidence of a 
significant worsening following the introduction of the criminal sanctions. One possibility, 
however, is that the worsening in spread measures and the PIN is the result of other events 
that have led to a deterioration of the market as a whole. We address this issue by employing 
a difference-in-difference approach to control for both market-wide effects and other factors 
affecting spreads and the PIN.
8, 9
 
 
The difference-in-difference approach involves comparing a treatment group which has been 
exposed to a change (in this case the introduction of criminal sanctions) with a control group 
                                                          
8
We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this valuable suggestion.  
9
See Roberts and Whited (2011) for an excellent treatment on difference-in-difference estimation. 
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that has not been exposed. As our event is a New Zealand-wide event, we employ a control 
group comprised of firms from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). The ASX represents 
the closest market to the NZX in terms of regulatory framework and with regards to the 
impact of the Global Financial Crisis.
10
 To select our control sample, we employ propensity 
scores to find the closest possible firm to our treatment firm. Firms have to come from the 
same industry (based on four digit SIC codes) and are matched based on the lowest 
propensity score calculated using market capitalization, book to market ratio and price for the 
twelve months prior to the change in law. We choose these factors as the basis of our 
matching criteria as they are related to the size of spreads in the market. Firms for which the 
same liquidity requirements imposed on our treatment group are not met, namely five trades 
per day and a minimum of thirty days of trading in both the pre- and post-change windows, 
are discarded and the next nearest match is taken instead. The control group consists of 43 
Australian firms that represent the same industry and the closest match on the other factors to 
our treatment firms. 
 
To determine the impact of the change in the legislation on our information asymmetry 
measures, we run a difference-in-difference regression in its first difference form, i.e. 
 
i
k
kik
NZX
ii ControlDIA    ,    (6) 
where ΔIAi is the difference in our microstructure measures between the pre- and post-change 
windows. We include a dummy variable, D
NZX
, which is equal to one if the firm in question is 
an NZX firm. Our variable of interest, β, can be viewed as the coefficient of the difference 
between the pre- and post-change difference between the New Zealand firms in the treatment 
group and the ASX firms in the control sample. A positive coefficient for β represents a 
worsening in the measure and would be supportive of the results presented in Table 2.  
 
 
In addition to controlling for market-wide events, we include other well known factors that 
affect spreads. Specifically, we control for the difference in the natural logarithm of the 
                                                          
10
As the crisis was largely driven by problems in the banking system, and New Zealand banks are 
predominantly subsidiaries of Australian banks there was a similar level of impact from the crisis. Further, both 
markets have been relatively insulated from the global recession by their reliance on commodity based exports.  
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average market capitalization before and after the change (ΔMV); the difference in the 
average market to book ratios (to control for growth opportunities) (ΔMB); the difference in 
the natural logarithm of the average number of trades per day (ΔT/D); and the difference in 
volatility (variance) of returns over the pre- and post-change windows (ΔVola). Many of 
these variables have been widely employed in the literature to control for spreads. However, 
as we estimate the difference-in-difference model in its first difference form, we do not 
expect many of these variables to have significant coefficients in our regressions. If we do 
find significance in these coefficients it implies a change between the treated and control 
samples that is not related to the change in legislation.   
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the regression coefficients for the twelve-month window and 
strongly suggests that criminalization has had a negative impact on the market. For three of 
the four spread measures and the PIN we observe a strongly significant and positive 
coefficient for D
NZX
. Only the coefficient for the effective spread is insignificant. The results 
indicate that after controlling for market-wide trends and other factors our information 
asymmetry measures are larger after the change in the law than before. We also observe 
significant increases in all the spread measures for the constant. This represents a general 
increase in information asymmetry measures in both markets between the pre- and post-
change periods. None of the other controls are consistently significant as expected. 
 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the same analysis for the six-month window. The results are 
broadly consistent with the results for the twelve-month window. We observe significant 
positive coefficients for effective spreads, the proportion of information asymmetry and the 
PIN. We further note significant increases in three of our measures for the constant. The other 
control variables are not consistently significant.  
 
Panel C of Table 4 presents the three-month window results. The results for this window are 
weaker than the previous two windows, suggesting that the implications of the law change 
may have taken some time to become fully reflected in the market. The immediate market 
reaction to the introduction however shows significance for the percentage spread and the 
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proportion of information asymmetry. We also observe little significance in the constant or in 
any of the other controls.  
 
As we noted earlier, it is likely that not all firms are affected equally by this law change. 
Firms that are more prone to insider trading (less liquid firms with high information 
asymmetry) should be affected to a greater extent if this law change has had the negative 
effect on market efficiency our results suggest. As with the difference in means tests where 
we sorted firms into those most likely to be affected, we introduce two dummies separately to 
account for those firms most likely to be affected by the law change and estimate the 
regression 
 
i
k
kik
Liq
i
NZX
ii ControlDDIA    ,       (7) 
 
where LiqiD  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a low trade or high information 
asymmetry firm in the NZX market, and δ measures the excess impact of the law change for 
low trade or high information asymmetry firms over all firms in the NZX sample.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results for Equation (5) where  two dummy variables for the 
most affected firms for the twelve-month window are included (we estimate this in separate 
regressions). All controls reported in Table 4 are included in these regressions, but are not 
reported for the sake of brevity. The two variables that we include separately are Low Trade, 
which equals 1 for the low trade group of NZX firms in the first five columns, and High IA, a 
dummy that equals 1 for high pre-change information asymmetry in the second five columns. 
The results support our earlier findings that the law change affects both low trade and high 
information asymmetry firms more than more liquid and firms with lower information 
asymmetry. We see positive significant coefficients on the dummies for the percentage and 
effective spreads and the price impact measure. LSB and PIN are significantly negative, 
consistent with the earlier findings in Table 3. The results further show that the coefficient on 
D
NZX
 remains significant and positive suggesting that the results in Table 4 are not only 
driven by a part of the sample, but that all firms are affected.  
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Panel B of Table 5 presents the same analysis conducted on the six-month window. We find 
similar results, with percentage and effective spreads significant for both sorts and the price 
impact and LSB significant for the low trade and high IA groups respectively. We again 
observe strong significance for D
NZX
, supporting the hypothesis that the law changes affected 
all firms.  
 
The results in Panel C of Table 5 are also supportive of the negative consequences of the 
changes. The low trade coefficient is significant and positive for four measures, while high 
IA is positive for three measures. We further find support for the effects being market wide 
with the exception of a few instances.    
 
Overall our results provide strong evidence that the criminal sanctions introduced to New 
Zealand in February 2008 have had the opposite effect to that intended by the policy makers. 
Rather than improve the efficiency of the market by deterring insiders it would appear that 
the market believes enforcement and so deterrence to now be weaker. As a result we see, in 
both the difference in means and in a multivariate setting employing differences-in-difference 
regressions, that spreads have widened as a result of an increase in the cost of information 
asymmetry and that informed trading has increased. Therefore, criminal sanctions do not 
appear to have been effective in controlling insiders.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Criminal sanctions for insider trading laws have been used widely around the globe by 
regulators in an effort to deter insider trading. While some commentators and academics have 
questioned the efficacy of these sanctions, there has been little empirical evidence regarding 
the benefits or costs of these sanctions. This study uses a unique opportunity to examine the 
introduction of criminal sanctions within a developed market, New Zealand.  
 
We collect data on companies for three windows, twelve, six and three months prior to and 
following the 29
th
 February 2008, the date that the new rules came into effect. Using an event 
study-type methodology, we explore changes in four spread-based measures that incorporate 
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the cost of information asymmetry; namely the percentage spread, effective spread, price 
impact of trades and Lin et al.’s (1995) proportion of information asymmetry measure, in 
addition to the PIN model (Easley et al., 1996, 1997a, 1997b). The results for all five 
measures show that the introduction of criminal sanctions in New Zealand for insider trading 
offences has resulted in a statistically significant increase in the cost of trading and the degree 
of information asymmetry. These results are also economically significant, as the effective 
spread has increased by an average of 63% in the period 12 months before the enactment and 
12 months after. Additional robustness tests including sorting on trading liquidity and pre-
change information asymmetry and a difference-in-difference approach confirm these 
findings. Overall, our findings suggest that the introduction of criminal sanctions has not 
been successful in reducing the impact of insider trading in New Zealand. These findings 
raise questions regarding the effectiveness of criminal sanctions, especially given their 
increasing acceptance around the world.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
   Twelve-Month Window 
 
Six Month Window Three Month Window 
  Full 
Sample 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Enactment Number of Trades 
 Average 17767.98 9144.98 8589.51 4473.84 2076.22 2043.90 4391.33 
 Std Dev 21355.59 10008.29 11562.56 5063.07 2424.72 2530.49 5976.66 
 Min  2634 1542 894 721 247 275 529 
 Max 111510 50085 61248 24435 11576 13067 31305 
Trades Per Day 
 Average 35.49 36.34 34.62 35.86 34.68 34.12 35.20 
 Std Dev 42.48 39.68 46.37 40.46 40.36 42.14 47.77 
 Min  5.82 6.56 4.24 6.15 5.04 5.00 4.64 
 Max 222.13 198.75 245.98 195.48 192.93 217.78 250.44 
Average Volume 
 Average 12273.5 12291.75 12358.17 12859.12 14449.75 11866.97 12136.77 
 Std Dev 10585.04 11880.16 11344.13 14426.15 22765.38 11143.58 10913.52 
 Min  2356.6 2321.90 1679.10 1783.33 1712.70 1604.56 1799.18 
 Max 47648 59369.00 62525.00 90173.25 158344.02 56156.48 50850.20 
Average Quoted Spread 
 Average 0.0642 0.0627 0.0662 0.0747 0.0735 0.0802 0.0840 
 Std Dev 0.1238 0.1259 0.1313 0.0952 0.0836 0.0993 0.1242 
 Min  0.0055 0.0054 0.0055 0.0098 0.0107 0.0091 0.0088 
 Max 0.6564 0.7753 0.7660 0.5083 0.4582 0.6471 0.8614 
Average Price (in NZ$) 
 Average 4.36 4.61 3.49 4.91 4.53 4.19 4.05 
 Std Dev 5.14 0.18 0.14 0.53 0.25 0.13 0.20 
 Min  27.94 32.66 25.08 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 
 Max 4.36 4.61 3.49 32.25 29.99 28.19 27.54 
Note: The Full Sample contains data on all trades for the sample of 51 companies for the period 28 February 2007 until February 28 2009. 
Number of Trades is the cross-sectional average of the number of trades in each period. Trades per Day is computed as the cross-sectional 
average of the total number of trades divided by the number of days a stock was traded. Average Volume is the cross-sectional average of the 
total volume within a period divided by the number of trades. Average Quoted Spread is computed as the cross-sectional average of the 
average of the difference between the ask and bid prices. Average Price is the cross-sectional average of the daily closing prices.  
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Table 2. Univariate Analysis of Information Asymmetry Measures 
  One Year Window Six Month Window Three Month Window 
 Full Sample Pre Enact Post Enact Pre Enact Post Enact Pre Enact Post Enact 
Panel A: Quoted Spreads 
Average 0.0223 0.0208 0.0238 0.0186 0.0246 0.0211 0.0311 
Median 0.0192 0.0176 0.0207 0.0153 0.0207 0.0180 0.0254 
Std Dev 0.0124 0.0117 0.0131 0.0102 0.0133 0.0119 0.0184 
First Quartile 0.0135 0.0123 0.0146 0.0113 0.0150 0.0133 0.0167 
Third Quartile 0.0290 0.0272 0.0307 0.0241 0.0341 0.0253 0.0424 
        
Average Diff   0.0029***  0.0057***  .0100*** 
T-Stat   3.17  5.71  6.87 
Median Diff   0.0031  0.0054**  .0073*** 
Number Increases   34  43  46 
Panel B: Effective Spreads 
Average 0.0194 0.0188 0.0200 0.0175 0.0203 0.0052 0.0085 
Median 0.0125 0.0129 0.0120 0.0115 0.0157 0.0046 0.0069 
Std Dev 0.0166 0.0158 0.0173 0.0148 0.0181 0.0027 0.0047 
First Quartile 0.0079 0.0085 0.0073 0.0081 0.0075 0.0034 0.0051 
Third Quartile 0.0276 0.0257 0.0295 0.0234 0.0296 0.0070 0.0115 
        
Average Diff   0.0012*  0.0028***  .0033*** 
T-Stat   1.72  3.06  8.27 
Median Diff   -0.001  0.0042  .0023*** 
Number Increases   29  30  50 
Panel C: Price Impacts 
Average 0.0045 0.0044 0.0046 0.0040 0.0047 0.0062 0.0099 
Median 0.0040 0.0039 0.0041 0.0034 0.0042 0.0056 0.0087 
Std Dev 0.0020 0.0018 0.0022 0.0017 0.0020 0.0025 0.0044 
First Quartile 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0027 0.0031 0.0043 0.0063 
Third Quartile 0.0059 0.0054 0.0063 0.0050 0.0063 0.0072 0.0125 
        
Average Diff   0.0004**  0.0008***  .0037*** 
T-Stat   2.06  5.46  9.18 
Median Diff   0.0002  0.0008**  .0031*** 
Number Increases   33  44  50 
Panel D: Proportion of Information Asymmetry 
Average 0.2647 0.2557 0.2736 0.2449 0.2753 0.2055 0.3213 
Median 0.2582 0.2501 0.2662 0.2305 0.2816 0.1975 0.2794 
Std Dev 0.1052 0.0969 0.1135 0.0871 0.0998 0.0795 0.1633 
First Quartile 0.1874 0.1850 0.1898 0.1830 0.2007 0.1352 0.2122 
Third Quartile 0.3289 0.3130 0.3447 0.3186 0.3360 0.2706 0.3798 
        
# Sig. Increase  25.4% 18 37.3% 19 66.7% 34 
# Sig. Decrease  15.7% 12 9.8% 5 3.9% 2 
Structural Breaks  88.2% 45 84.3% 43 88.2% 45 
Panel E: Probability of Informed Trading 
Average 0.2319 0.2194 0.2444 0.2044 0.2364 0.2255 0.2194 
Median 0.2246 0.2143 0.2349 0.1914 0.2277 0.2040 0.2156 
Std Dev 0.0671 0.0604 0.0738 0.0641 0.0621 0.0660 0.0518 
First Quartile 0.1849 0.1805 0.1892 0.1648 0.1862 0.1749 0.1790 
Third Quartile 0.2810 0.2621 0.2998 0.2399 0.2808 0.2666 0.2578 
        
Average Diff   0.0249***  0.0319***  .0054 
T-Stat   2.9568  3.9652  .65 
Median Diff   0.0206  0.0363**  .0116 
Number Increases   31  34  25 
Note: Full Sample covers the period 28 February 2007 until February 28 2009. Percentage Spreads are calculated as the cross-sectional 
average of the bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint of the spread. Effective Spreads arere calculated as the cross-sectional average of the 
transaction price less the midpoint of the spread divided by the midpoint of the spread. Price Impacts are calculated as the cross-sectional 
average of the midpoint of the spread 5 minutes after a trade minus the midpoint of the spread at the time of the trade divided by the 
midpoint of the spread at the time of the trade. Significance for these measures is assessed using a matched-pairs t-test. Proportion of 
Information Asymmetry is computed using the Lin et al. (1995) decomposition model. This is calculated as the cross-sectional average of λ 
in the regression formula
11   ttt ezm  where, Δmt is the change in the log of the quoted midpoint at time t, and ttt mpz  , where 
pt is the log of the trade price at time t. Significant increase/decrease is calculated using a Wald Test. The Probability of Informed Trading 
is computed following Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b) and significance is assessed using a paired t-test. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 3. Trading Activity and Information Asymmetry Sorts 
 One Year Window Six Month Window Three Month Window 
 Pre 
Enact 
Post 
Enact 
Diff Pre 
Enact 
Post 
Enact 
Diff Pre 
Enact 
Post 
Enact 
Diff 
Panel A: Sort by Pre-Change Trading Activity 
Quoted Spread          
Low Trades 0.0294 0.0410 0.0117*** 0.0279 0.0347 0.0077*** 0.310 0.0340 0.0041** 
High Trades 0.0143 0.0213 0.007*** 0.0140 0.0144 0.0014 0.0141 0.0142 0.0001 
Effective 
Spread 
         
Low Trades 0.0076 0.0121 0.0045*** 0.0334 0.0408 0.0074** 0.0367 0.0428 0.0061 
High Trades 0.0030 0.0047 0.0017*** 0.0103 0.0105 0.0003 0.0106 0.0109 0.0003 
Price Impact          
Low Trades 0.0078 0.0121 0.0043*** 0.0052 0.0064 0.0012*** 0.0057 0.0063 0.0006 
High Trades 0.0048 0.0075 0.0028*** 0.0030 0.0031 0.0001 0.0030 0.0033 0.0001 
Prop of IA          
Low Trades 0.2542 0.3653 0.1111** 0.2719 0.3240 0.0521*** 0.2601 0.3183 0.0581** 
High Trades 0.1460 0.2845 0.1385*** 0.1937 0.2075 0.0134 0.2192 0.2179 -0.0013 
PIN           
Low Trades 0.2735 0.2429 -0.0306** 0.2321 0.2700 0.379** 0.2531 0.2868 0.0337* 
High Trades 0.1739 0.1951 0.0212* 0.1632 0.1970 0.0338** 0.1814 0.1944 0.0130 
Panel B: Sort by Pre-Change Information Asymmetry 
Quoted Spread          
Low IA 0.0185 0.0263 0.0078*** 0.0188 0.0225 0.0029** 0.0179 0.0231 0.0052*** 
High IA 0.0234 0.0372 0.0138*** 0.0208 0.0232 0.0028 0.0193 0.0233 0.0055** 
Effective 
Spread 
         
Low IA 0.0041 0.0063 0.0022*** 0.0107 0.0120 0.0013 0.0102 0.0112 0.0010 
High IA 0.0066 0.0108 0.0042*** 0.0591 0.0648 0.0046 0.0524 0.0642 0.0101** 
Price Impact          
Low IA 0.0055 0.0086 0.0031*** 0.0038 0.0041 0.0003 0.0036 0.0040 0.0005** 
High IA 0.0069 0.0113 0.0044*** 0.0050 0.0054 0.0003 0.0044 0.0055 0.0011*** 
Prop of IA          
Low IA 0.1252 0.2601 0.1349*** 0.1842 0.2055 0.0213 0.1670 0.2114 0.0444** 
High IA 0.2886 0.3350 0.0464* 0.3242 0.3641 0.0163 0.3313 0.3498 0.0250* 
PIN           
Low IA 0.1858 0.2019 0.0161 0.1997 0.2395 0.0398** 0.1807 0.2317 0.0510*** 
High IA 0.2628 0.2458 -0.017 0.2311 0.2586 0.0275** 0.2232 0.2512 0.0279** 
Note: This table reports the change in information asymmetry measures for sorts on pre-change trading activity (Panel A) and sorts on pre-
change information asymmetry (Panel B).  Quoted Spreads are calculated as the cross-sectional average of the bid-ask spread divided by the 
midpoint of the spread. Effective Spreads are calculated as the cross-sectional average of the transaction price less the midpoint of the spread 
divided by the midpoint of the spread. Price Impacts are calculated as the cross-sectional average of the midpoint of the spreads 5 minutes after 
a trade less the midpoint of the spread at the time of the trade divided by the midpoint of the spread at the time of the trade. Statistical 
significance is calculated using a matched-pairs t-test. Prop of IA  is computed using the Lin et al. (1995) decomposition model and   he 
Probability of Informed Trading is computed following Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b) and significance is assessed using a paired t-test. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 4. Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Information Asymmetry Measures 
 Constant D
NZX
 ΔMV ΔMB ΔT/D ΔVola R2 
Panel A: Twelve-Month Window 
PS 0.0125*** 0.0175** 0.0116 0.0089 0.0087 0.0016 0.1655 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.015) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)  
ES 0.0045*** 0.0089 0.0041 0.0044 0.0005 0.0058 0.0969 
 (0.001) (0.006) 
) 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)  
PI 0.0040*** 0.0036*** 0.0024 0.0021* 0.001 0.0002 0.1851 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  
PROP 0.1547*** 0.1750*** 0.1072* 0.003 0.0216 0.0161 0.2878 
 (0.031) (0.038) (0.055) (0.016) (0.057) (0.051)  
PIN -0.003 0.0446** -0.0192 0.0106 0.0416** -0.002 0.1246 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.024) (0.009) (0.020) (0.024)  
Panel B: Six-Month Window 
PS 0.0036* 0.0071 -0.0093 0.0146 0.0002 0.003 0.0992 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004)  
ES 0.0022* 0.0037* -0.0007 0.0074 0.0025 -0.0008 0.0754 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)  
PI 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0030** 0.0049 0.0015 0.0006 0.1365 
 (0.000 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)  
PROP 0.0295 0.0822* -0.0821 -0.0926 0.0265 -0.0036 0.0581 
 (0.018) (0.044) (0.080) (0.161) (0.059) (0.038)  
PIN 0.0276** 0.0619** 0.0318 0.069 0.0200 -0.0291 0.1238 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.063) (0.076) (0.036) (0.024)  
Panel C: Three-Month Window 
PS 0.0017 0.0069*** -0.0031 0.0056 -0.0115 -0.0053* 0.2286 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)  
ES 0.0014* 0.0000 0.0018 0.0016 -0.0056*** 0.0006 0.0955 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  
PI 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0009 -0.0021 0.0014 0.0532 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  
PROP 0.019 0.0970* -0.0642 0.0575 0.0622 0.005 0.0488 
 (0.023) (0.057) (0.180) (0.071) (0.098) (0.059)  
PIN 0.0126 0.0303 -0.0168 -0.0014 -0.0192 -0.0501** 0.1199 
 (0.012) (0.030) (0.082) (0.030) (0.049) (0.020)  
Note: This table reports the regression results for the difference-in-difference estimation. Regressions were conducted on 94 observations, the 
difference in the pre- and post-change values for 51 NZX companies and 43 ASX companies.  In Panel A, B, and C we present the results for 
the twelve-, six- and three-month window before and after the enactment of the new legislation, respectively. The results are presented for the 
quoted spread (QS), effective spread (ES), the price impact of trades (PI), the proportion of information asymmetry (PROP), and the 
probability of informed trading (PIN). The variable of interest is DNZX which captures the effect of the change in legislation on the various 
information asymmetry measures. We control for the change in log market value (ΔMV), the change in market to book ratio (ΔMB), the 
change in the log of the trades per day (ΔT/D), and the change in the variance of stock returns (ΔVola). Robust standard errors are presented 
in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 5. Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Information Asymmetry Sorts 
 QS ES PI PROP PIN QS ES PI PROP PIN 
Panel A: Twelve-Month Window 
Constant 0.0098 0.0038 0.0035 0.1789** 0.0079 0.0083 0.0020 0.0030 0.1540* 0.0145 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.009) 
DLow Trade 0.0060*** 0.0016*** 0.0010*** -0.052*** -0.023***      
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)      
DHigh IA      0.0086*** 0.0049*** 0.0020*** 0.0015 -0.0355 
      (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.019) (0.010) 
DNZX 0.0146*** 0.0082**** 0.003*** 0.200*** 0.0558*** 0.0137*** 0.007*** 0.0027*** 0.174*** 0.060*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.014) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.004) 
R2 0.1700 0.0977 0.1888 0.2982 0.1358 0.1744 0.1047 0.1989 0.2878 0.1493 
Panel B: Six-Month Window 
Constant 0.0011 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0248* 0.0498** 0.0016 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0142 0.0295 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.005) 
DLow Trade 0.0056*** 0.0040*** 0.0006*** 0.0108 -0.0504**      
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.002)      
DHigh IA      0.0041** 0.0032*** 0.0012 0.0311* -0.0038 
      (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.003) 
DNZX 0.0047*** 0.0020* 0.0009*** 0.0775*** 0.0839*** 0.0053*** 0.0023** 0.0007**** 0.068*** 0.06*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
R2 0.1173 0.1090 0.1406 0.0587 0.1500 0.1086 0.0963 0.1503 0.0634 0.1240 
Panel C: Three-Month Window 
Constant 0.0003 0.0012* 0.0004 0.0006 0.0234 0.0017 0.0010 0.0003 0.0031 0.0035 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.008) 
DLow Trade 0.003*** 0.0004*** 0.0001*** 0.0397*** -0.02***      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.007)      
DHigh IA      -0.0001 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0340 0.0196*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.029) (0.007) 
DNZX 0.006*** -0.0002 -0.0004*** 0.0783** 0.0413*** 0.0069*** -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0832 0.0223 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.036) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.030) (0.016) 
R2 0.2353 0.0964 0.0532 0.0535 0.1255 0.2286 0.0978 0.0542 0.0520 0.1235 
Note: This table reports the regression results for the difference-in-difference estimation of the information asymmetry sorts. Regressions were conducted 
on 94 observations, the difference in the pre- and post-change values for 51 NZX companies and 43 ASX companies.  In Panel A, B, and C we present the 
results for the twelve-, six- and three-month window before and after the enactment of the new legislation, respectively. The results are presented for the 
quoted spread (QS), effective spread (ES), the price impact of trades (PI), the proportion of information asymmetry (PROP), and the probability of 
informed trading (PIN). The variables of interest are DLow Trade, which is a dummy that is equal to 1 for an illiquid NZX firm and zero otherwise, DHigh IA, 
which is a dummy that is equal to 1 for an NZX firm has a high pre-change information asymmetry and  DNZX, which captures the effect of the change in 
legislation on the various information asymmetry measures. We control for the change in log market value, the change in market to book ratio, the change 
in the log of the trades per day, and the change in the variance of stock returns, but do not report these results for the sake of brevity. Robust standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
